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Automated Reasoning for Security
Protocol Analysis
Experience over the past 20 years has shown that, even assuming perfect
cryptography, the design of security protocols (or cryptographic protocols, as
they are sometimes called) is highly error-prone and that conventional validation
techniques based on informal arguments or testing are not up to the task. It is
now widely recognized that only formal analysis can provide the level of
assurance required by both the developers and the users of the protocols.
Work in this direction initially started in the security community, but
recently there has been a tremendous progress thanks to contributions from
different automated reasoning communities, such as automated deduction,
model checking, and artificial intelligence. Moreover, there has been another
wave of progress in foundations for analyzing protocols and their properties by
applying nonclassical logics, such as epistemic and belief logics. A large
number of formal methods and tools have thus been developed that have been
quite successful in analyzing many protocols, that is, in proving the correctness
of the protocols or in identifying attacks on them. Thus, this progress can
be seen as one of the recent success stories of the automated reasoning
community.
In July 2004, the first workshop on Automated Reasoning for Security
Protocol Analysis (ARSPA ’04) took place as a satellite event of the 2nd In-
ternational Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning (IJCAR ’04).
This special issue is based on 21 submissions, following an open call for
papers motivated by the success of the workshop. After refereeing, we selected
five papers for publication. These papers offer a good overview of the current
research on automated reasoning techniques and tools for the formal specifica-
tion, analysis, and verification of security protocols.
The paper Verifying the SET Purchase Protocols, by Bella, Massacci, and
Paulson, details the first verification results for the complete purchase protocols
of SET (Secure Electronic Transaction, a suite of protocols proposed by a
consortium of credit card companies and software corporations to secure e-
commerce transactions). Using Isabelle and the inductive method, they show that
the protocols’ primary goal is indeed met. However, a lack of explicitness in the
dual signature makes some agreement properties fail: it is impossible to prove
that the cardholder meant to send his credit card details to the very payment
gateway that receives them. Although the protocols’ complexity and size makes
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verification difficult, compared with other protocols, the authors’ effort has
yielded significant insights.
In the paper Formal Analysis of MultiParty Contract Signing Chadha,
Kremer, and Scedrov analyze the multiparty contract-signing protocols of Garay
and MacKenzie (GM) and of Baum and Waidner (BW). They use a finite-state
tool, MOCHA, that allows for the specification of protocol properties in a
branching-time temporal logic with a game semantics. While their analysis does
not reveal any errors in the BW protocol, in the GM protocol they discover
serious problems with fairness for four signers and an oversight regarding abuse-
freeness for three signers. They thus propose a complete revision of the GM
subprotocols in order to restore fairness.
In the paper Decision Procedures for the Security of Protocols with
Probabilistic Encryption against Offline Dictionary Attacks, Delaune and
Jacquemard consider the problem of automatic protocol verification when some
data, such as poorly chosen passwords, can be guessed by dictionary attacks.
They propose an inference system that extends a set of DolevYYao intruder
deduction rules with the introduction of a probabilistic encryption operator and
guessing abilities for the intruder. They show that the intruder deduction problem
in this extended model is decidable in PTIME. This result yields an NP decision
procedure for the protocol insecurity problem in the presence of a
passive intruder, while the same problem is proved to be NP-complete in the
active case.
In the paper Decidability Issues for Extended Ping-Pong Protocols, Hu¨ttel
and Srba use techniques from process algebra to investigate the class of ping-
pong protocols introduced by Dolev and Yao. They show that all nontrivial
properties, including reachability and equivalence checking with respect to the
entire van Glabbeek’s spectrum, become undecidable for a very simple recursive
extension of the protocol. The result holds even if a nondeterministic choice
operator is not allowed, but reachability is shown to be decidable in polynomial
time if only two parties are participating in the protocol. They also show that the
calculus is capable of an implicit description of the active intruder, including full
analysis and synthesis of messages in the sense of Amadio, Lugiez, and
Vanacke`re. Further, they show that reachability analysis for a replicative
protocol variant is decidable.
The starting point of the paper Attacking Group Protocols by Refuting
Incorrect Inductive Conjectures, by Steel and Bundy, is the observation that
automated tools for finding attacks on flawed security protocols often fail to deal
adequately with group protocols. The reason is that the abstractions made to
improve performance on fixed two- or three-party protocols either preclude the
modeling of group protocols or permit modeling only in a fixed scenario, which
can prevent attacks from being discovered. Their paper describes CORAL, a tool
for finding counterexamples to incorrect inductive conjectures, which they have
used to model protocols for both group key agreement and group key
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management, without any restrictions on the scenario. They used CORAL to
discover six previously unknown attacks on three group protocols.
This special issue could not have been possible without the excellent work of
the additional reviewers, to whom we express special thanks: Pedro Ada˜o (IST
Lisbon, Portugal), Massimo Benerecetti (Universita` di Napoli FFederico II_,
Italy), Carlos Caleiro (IST Lisbon, Portugal), Luca Compagna (Universita` di
Genova, Italy), Giorgio Delzanno (Universita` di Genova, Italy), Pierre Ganty
(Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium), Paul Hankes Drielsma (ETH Zurich,
Switzerland), Pierre-Cyrille He´am (Universite´ de Franche-Comte´, France), Felix
Klaedtke (ETH Zurich, Switzerland), Monika Maidl (Siemens AG Mu¨nchen,
Germany), Jacopo Mantovani (Universita` di Genova, Italy), Paulo Mateus (IST
Lisbon, Portugal), Laurent Mazare´ (VERIMAG, France), Adriano Peron
(Universita` di Napoli FFederico II_, Italy), Graham Steel (University of
Edinburgh, Scotland), Sorin Stratulat (Universite´ de Metz, France), Tomasz
Truderung (LORIA-INRIA-Lorraine, France), Mathieu Turuani (LORIA-INRIA-
Lorraine, France), Laurent Vigneron (LORIA-INRIA-Lorraine, France), and
David von Oheimb (Siemens AG Mu¨nchen, Germany).
We further thank all the authors for their work in preparing and revising the
papers, and the JAR editors who made all this possible.
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